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Abstract—Mobile Crowd Sensing is an emerging sensing 
paradigm that employs massive number of workers’ mobile 
devices to realize data collection. Unlike most task allocation 
mechanisms that aim at optimizing the global system performance, 
stable matching considers workers are selfish and rational 
individuals, which has become a hotspot in MCS. However, 
existing stable matching mechanisms lack deep consideration 
regarding the effects of workers’ competition phenomena and 
complex behaviors. To address the above issues, this paper 
investigates the competition-congestion-aware stable matching 
problem as a multi-objective optimization task allocation problem 
considering the competition of workers for tasks. First, a worker 
decision game based on congestion game theory is designed to 
assist workers in making decisions, which avoids fierce 
competition and improves worker satisfaction. On this basis, a 
stable matching algorithm based on extended deferred acceptance 
algorithm is designed to make workers and tasks mapping stable, 
and to construct a shortest task execution route for each worker. 
Simulation results show that the designed model and algorithm are 
effective in terms of worker satisfaction and platform benefit. 
 
Index Terms—Mobile crowd sensing, stable matching, task 
allocation, congestion game, deferred acceptance. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE Internet of Things (IoT) utilizes sensor-based 
embedded systems to interact with others, providing a wide 
range of applications and services to upper-level users [1]. 
Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) is an emerging pervasive 
sensing paradigm in IoT uses massive number of workers’ 
smart mobile terminals (smart phones, tablet computers, 
sensors, etc.), due to their availability at large scale, wide 
distribution, and high sensing capabilities to collect sensing 
data with high correlation and strong analyzability [2]. 
Therefore, MCS is considered as an economic, effective, and 
reliable sensing scheme [3] providing great support in pervasive 
computing domain such as intelligent transportation [4], 
environmental monitoring [5], healthcare application [6], urban 
public management [7], and so forth. 
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In MCS, task allocation is a fundamental and important 
research issue, which has become a hot topic in the fields of 
social computing, cooperative computing, and intelligent 
computing in recent years [8]. Existing works on task allocation 
mechanism mostly aim at optimizing the global system 
performance, while ignoring the mutual preferences between 
workers and crowdsensing tasks. Since workers and platform 
are owned by different entities with the possibility of having 
diverse needs resulting in conflict among the maximization of 
worker satisfaction or platform benefit. For example, workers 
prefer tasks according to their own satisfaction, while the 
platform wants to allocate tasks to workers with better service 
qualities and lower sensing costs to maximize platform benefit. 
In addition, the platform generally does not change the 
formulated allocation strategy in practical applications. 
However, since workers are selfish and rational individuals, 
they are not necessarily aligned with platform optimization [9]. 
Workers may violate the current task allocation scheme when 
they are not satisfied with the allocated tasks, which results in 
system instability. Here, the system instability means that the 
established allocation strategy cannot be completed due to the 
dissatisfaction of workers. 
In order to solve the conflict of interest between platform and 
workers and avoid system instability, some previous works 
[10]–[14] from the recent literatures utilize stable matching 
theory to transform task allocation problem into two-sided 
matching problem. However, there are still some deficiencies 
in these studies. They assume that workers are only concerned 
about their personal benefit and select tasks based on their 
preferences in contrast to the case where workers need to 
compete for the tasks in the resource pool. As the workers are 
not fully aware of the status of other workers’ applications for 
tasks, they often apply for tasks based on their own preferences 
and historical experience, resulting in fierce competition for 
some tasks among the workers. Since the number of workers 
required for a specific task is constrained, massive workers 
picking the same task will result in partly workers matching the 
task while remaining workers not. Although stable matching 
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can map the suboptimal task options for the remaining workers 
which may reduce their interest for participation in sensing 
activities. 
In order to address the aforementioned issues, this paper 
investigates the competition-congestion-aware stable matching 
problem as a multi-objective optimization task allocation 
problem considering the competition of workers for tasks 
obtaining a unique and optimal solution. To accomplish this 
problem, there are at least two challenges. Firstly, the 
competition and complex behaviors of workers pose a 
challenge in designing an appropriate model to assist workers 
in making decisions. Secondly, different from the traditional 
unilateral optimization problem, the conflict between the 
maximization of platform benefit and the worker’s desire to 
receive satisfactory tasks results in another critical challenge. 
In this work, in order to study the competition on workers’ 
decision-making, competition congestion metric is proposed to 
measure the competition of workers for tasks. On this basis, a 
worker decision model based on congestion game theory is 
designed by jointly considering worker benefit, worker 
preference, and competition congestion metric. The model 
assists workers in making decisions by publishing their 
application status for tasks, which avoids fierce competition and 
improves worker satisfaction. Here, avoiding fierce 
competition does not mean ignoring the fact that workers 
compete for tasks in practical applications. When the number 
of workers applying for a task exceeds the number of workers 
required for the task, a stable matching algorithm based on 
extended deferred acceptance algorithm is designed to allocate 
a set of tasks to each worker, and to construct shortest task 
execution routes for them. The algorithm can not only satisfy 
the workers as much as possible, but also improve platform 
benefit by allocating tasks to the most beneficial workers when 
the workers compete for task resources. 
The main contributions are summarized as follows: 
(1) We investigate the drawback of existing solutions for 
stable matching in MCS, and study a novel problem by 
introducing competition congestion metric for each task. 
Keeping the metric in mind, this paper aims to avoid the 
fierce competition among workers for tasks, and to 
allocate an appropriate set of tasks to each worker 
through many-to-many stable matching to maximize 
worker satisfaction, as well as maximize platform 
benefit. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
consider the influence of competition on worker 
behavior for stable matching in MCS. 
(2) We design a worker decision game based on congestion 
game theory to generate utility list for each worker, 
which jointly considers the influence of worker benefit, 
worker preference, and competition congestion metric 
on worker behavior. Then, we design a stable matching 
algorithm based on extended deferred acceptance 
algorithm. The algorithm incorporates both workers’ 
utility lists and tasks’ benefit lists to make workers and 
tasks mapping stable according to three designed rules, 
and then constructs a shortest task execution route for 
each worker. 
(3) We evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism 
by comparing it with traditional benchmark stable 
matching algorithm and five baseline task allocation 
algorithms from the recent state-of-the-art. The results 
verify that, under various settings, the proposed 
mechanism is effective in terms of worker satisfaction 
and platform benefit. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
the related works are introduced. In Section III, the system 
models are introduced. Accordingly, the competition-
congestion-aware stable matching algorithm (CCASM) is 
designed to realize the system models in Section IV. The 
performance evaluation and discussion are given in Section V. 
Finally, Section VI discusses the future work directions and 
Section VII concludes this paper. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
In this section, the relevant works from the recent state of the 
art on unstable task allocation, stable matching, and game 
theory in MCS are presented. Due to the few researches on 
using game theory to solve task allocation, the main 
presentation of relevant works on game theory is the research 
of improving MCS incentive mechanism utilizing game theory. 
A. Unstable Task Allocation in Mobile Crowd Sensing 
 The earlier research works on MCS focused on single task 
allocation wherein a task is allocated to only one worker for 
execution. Zhang et al. proposed a novel worker selection 
framework named CrowdRecruiter [15], which can find a near-
minimal set of workers for a task that meets its coverage ratio 
requirement. On similar trend, Xiong et al. defined a novel 
spatial-temporal coverage metric named k-depth coverage [16] 
by selecting a group of workers for the task according to 
different optimization goals to participate in the sensing 
activities. In [17], Liu et al. proposed an energy-efficient 
participant selection scheme that could meet the high quality-
of-information requirements for the services incorporating the 
energy efficiency requirements of the workers. 
With the increasing number of tasks in MCS given the 
limited sensing resources (e.g., the number of workers, the 
power of mobile devices, the type of sensors mounted on 
mobile devices), the multi-task allocation has become a hot 
research topic, wherein multiple tasks are allocated to multiple 
workers for execution. In [18], Wang et al. proposed a novel 
multi-task allocation framework named Mtasker to allocate 
appropriate tasks to each worker to maximize the overall system 
utility by introducing task-specific minimal sensing quality 
thresholds. In [19], Hu et al. studied the Quality of Service (QoS) 
based sensitive task allocation problem for MCS involving 
variable tasks and flexible rewards with the aid of a greedy 
algorithm to solve the aforementioned problem. Due to the 
diverse time-sensitivity and delay tolerant requirements of the 
tasks, a worker selection framework named ActiveCrowd was 
proposed to select suitable workers to minimize the cost [20]. 
Another work considered two situations depending on the 
number of tasks and workers, such as the case of more tasks 
with less workers and less tasks with more workers [21]. 
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Most of the above-mentioned research works focused on 
optimizing the global system performance assuming that 
workers are selfless, i.e., completing each task allocated by the 
platform unconditionally. In reality, workers are selfish and 
rational individuals, which is not necessarily aligned with 
platform optimization causing unstable consequences. In order 
to tackle this issue, this paper formulates the multi-task 
allocation problem into a stable matching problem. 
B. Stable Matching in Mobile Crowd Sensing 
Stable matching algorithms have been used in many two-
sided matching problems in various fields. For example, the 
authors in [22] proposed a modified swap matching algorithm 
based on stable matching theory to allocate the spectrum 
resource rationally when both macro-cellular and femto-
cellular users coexist in the same network. Baïou and Balinski 
proposed a stable allocation (or ordinal transportation) problem 
[23], which is a many-to-many generalization of the classical 
stable matching problem.  
In contrast to the existing task allocation mechanisms that 
may cause instability resulting in the application of stable 
matching in MCS. Initially the stable matching was mainly used 
to study the one-to-one matching problems. For example, Zhou 
et al. [10] solved the route planning and task allocation problem 
of UAV-aided MCS by studying the influence of benefit on 
matching, with the goal of minimizing energy consumption. 
Chen [11] analyzed the existing task allocation types, and 
proposed a stable task allocation algorithm to match workers 
and tasks by considering worker preference. Later on, some 
researches have investigated the stable matching for the many-
to-one and many-to-many matching problems which is more 
suitable for MCS scenarios. Zhang et al. [9] studied a matching 
problem between workers and task requesters by considering 
workers’ preferences and different types of tasks. The authors 
in [12] and [13] studied the stable matching between workers 
and task requesters under the constraint of budget in many-to-
one and many-to-many scenarios, respectively. Abououf et al. 
[14] studied a framework based on many-to-many stable 
matching, which can maximize the level of worker satisfaction, 
QoS and the completion confidence of the tasks. 
In this paper, we investigate a competition-congestion-aware 
stable matching problem and extend the deferred acceptance 
algorithm to many-to-many by considering the multi-task 
allocation scenario. Different from existing studies on workers 
matching task requesters [9], [12], [13] and one-to-one worker-
task matching [11], a pervasive model of multiple workers 
matching multiple tasks is formulated. In contrast to the study 
using stable matching to achieve multi-task allocation [14], our 
designed model aims to avoid the fierce competition among 
workers for tasks and solve the conflict of interest between 
platform and workers. Our proposed work investigates the 
influence of worker benefit, worker preference, and 
competition congestion metric on worker’s behavior in 
matching process, which is more align with the real situation in 
MCS. In addition, the concept of stable matching in many-to-
many scenarios is redefined in our proposed work, and the 
corresponding analysis of stability, optimization and 
complexity is presented. 
C. Game Theory 
Game theory is a theoretical framework that studies strategic 
interactions, which is applied to formulate and tackle the 
phenomena of struggle and competition. Till now, some MCS 
studies have utilized game theory to develop optimization 
strategies for incentive mechanism. For example, the most 
common approaches mentioned in [24]–[26] to establish 
models based on game theory are used to motivate the 
participations of mobile sensing workers. In addition, reverse 
auction approach [27] in game theory is also a common model 
in the study of incentive mechanism. 
Due to the difference between the behavior pattern of nodes 
in game theory and that of workers in MCS, the existing game 
theory concepts cannot be directly applied to task allocation. 
Therefore, we study the factors that influence the decision-




Ti, ti, TN A task Ti, number of samples required for task Ti, and task set containing all tasks. 
Wj, wj, WK A worker Wj, maximum workload of worker Wj, and worker set containing all workers. 
ci, j, xi, j The status of whether worker Wj applies for task Ti, the status of whether task Ti is allocated to worker Wj. 
Hi, j, Bi, j The utility/benefit that is achieved by allocating task Ti to worker Wj to be accomplished. 
Pi, j, Ci, j, Fi, j The reward/cost/benefit for worker Wj to accomplish task Ti. 
sj, S, S-j Worker Wj’s strategy profile, set of strategy profiles for all workers, and set of strategy profiles for all workers except worker Wj. 
Ii(S) Competition congestion metric of task Ti under the strategy profile S. 
δi, j Worker Wj’s preference for task Ti. 
Ui, j The utility for worker Wj to accomplish task Ti. 
Ei, j Worker Wj’s goal for the utility of completing task Ti. 
Gi, j(S), Gj(S), Φ(S) Worker Wj’s score for completing task Ti under S, worker Wj’s score under S, and the score of all workers under S. 
Li, Lj Task Ti’s benefit list, worker Wj’s utility list. 
Vj Worker Wj’s satisfaction. 
Hj, Bj, Pj The utility/benefit that worker Wj brings to the platform, the total reward to worker Wj. 
BRSj(S) Better response set of worker Wj under the strategy profile S. 
Ti·pair, Ti·re Number of pairs that task Ti has matched, remaining number of pairs that task Ti can be matched. 
Wj·pair, Wj·re Number of pairs that worker Wj has matched, remaining number of pairs that worker Wj can be matched. 
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III. SYSTEM MODELS 
In this work, a multi-task allocation scenario is considered 
where the platform wants to allocate multiple tasks to multiple 
workers. In this scenario, each task can be allocated to multiple 
workers while each worker can receive multiple tasks. The 
system model, as shown in Fig. 1, is divided into two stages. To 
ease the presentation, the main symbols used in this paper are 
summarized in Table I.  
Stage 1: Task requesters delegate various sensing tasks to the 
platform and provide detailed task information (e.g. task 
location, sensing content, number of samples required for the 
task, etc.). Then, the platform publishes accepted tasks to 
workers at an appropriate time (newly arrived tasks will be 
postponed to the next task allocation), and provides workers a 
certain time session to submit and modify their applications for 
tasks that they are satisfied with through worker decision game. 
After that, the platform generates a utility list for each worker 
by ranking the relevant tasks from high to low according to the 
utilities to the worker. In addition, the platform generates a 
benefit list for each task by ranking workers in descending order 
according to the benefit to the task. 
Stage 2: By incorporating both workers’ utility lists and tasks’ 
benefit lists, the platform realizes a many-to-many stable 
matching for worker-task pairs, based on which, a shortest task 
execution route is designed for each worker. When the tasks are 
sensed completely, the worker uploads the sensing data to the 
platform, and the platform sends the sensing results to task 
requesters. 
In this scenario, we make the following assumptions. Firstly, 
similar to existing recent research works (e.g. [18][28]), to 
avoid workers accepting more tasks than they can handle, each 
worker is allowed to set a maximum workload, that is, the 
maximum number of tasks that the worker can accept. Secondly, 
the physical parameters of each mobile device can be obtained 
when the worker registers onto the platform. Finally, we assume 
that the worker’s location is available during task allocation 
through GPS, Wi-Fi, and cellular networks [29]. 
With the aforementioned system model and assumptions, 
first of all, it is necessary to generate the worker’s utility list 
and the task’s benefit list for each worker and task. Then, based 
on the generated lists, workers and tasks can be stably matched 
under the constraints of the maximum workload of workers and 
the number of samples required for tasks. 
A. List Generation 
Denote the set of k workers as WK = {W1, …, Wj, …, Wk}, 
and the set of n tasks as TN = {T1, …, Ti, …, Tn}. In MCS, the 
number of tasks that workers can execute over a period of time 
is constrained, and the maximum workload of worker Wj is 
denoted as wj. In addition, the number of samples required for 
task Ti is denoted as ti. We assume that the worker can only 
provide one sample for a task in task allocation to ensure the 
quality of the sample. 
When the platform publishes task information, workers can 
apply for the tasks they want to perform. The status of whether 
worker Wj applies for task Ti is denoted as ci, j, which is a binary 
value, where ci, j = 1 represents worker Wj applying for task Ti, 
and otherwise ci, j = 0. Workers can add tasks they apply for to 
their strategy profiles, and each worker’s strategy profile is 
denoted as sj = {Ti  TN  ci, j = 1}. The set of strategy profiles 
for all k workers can be denoted as S = {s1, …, sj, …, sk}. After 
that, the platform will try to allocate tasks to the worker 
according to worker’s strategy profile, and the allocation state 
between task Ti and worker Wj is denoted as xi, j, where xi, j = 1 
represents that Ti is allocated to Wj, and otherwise xi, j = 0. 
Stage 1
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Fig. 1.  The system model. 
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1) Generate the task’s benefit list 
For a task, the main factors affecting its sensing utility 
include the sensing quality and the sensing time. Hence, the 
sensing utility that is achieved by allocating task Ti to worker 
Wj to be accomplished is calculated as 
 Hi, j = α ⋅ Qj ⋅ STi, j,  (1) 
where α is the price coefficient, which is used to transform time 
units into monetary units, e.g., dollars. Q
j
 represents the sensing 
quality of worker Wj, with a value between 0 and 1, which is 
determined by the platform according to the physical 
parameters of the worker’s mobile device. STi, j represents the 
sensing time that worker Wj takes to execute task Ti. 
After a task is completed by a worker, the platform needs to 
pay the worker a certain reward, which is positively correlated 
to sensing quality, sensing time, and movement time. Hence, 
the reward for worker Wj to accomplish task Ti is calculated as 
 Pi, j = β ⋅ Qj ⋅ (MTi, j + STi, j), (2) 
where β is the price coefficient, which plays a similar role to α. 
MTi, j represents the movement time, the time worker Wj takes 
to move to the destination of task Ti, which is calculated as 
 MTi, j = di, j  v, (3) 
where di, j represents the Euclidean distance between task Ti and 
worker Wj. v represents the average movement speed of 
workers, which is a fixed value for all workers and is introduced 
to transform distance into time. 
Therefore, for task Ti, the benefit that is achieved by 
allocating task Ti to worker Wj to be accomplished is calculated 
as 
 Bi, j = Hi, j − Pi, j. (4) 
Considering that the platform wants to allocate tasks to 
workers with better service qualities and lower sensing costs to 
maximize task benefit, for each task Ti  TN, its benefit list Li 
containing all workers is generated, in which workers are sorted 
from high to low according to the benefit Bi, j they bring to task 
Ti.  
2) Generate the worker’s utility list based on worker decision 
game 
Different from tasks, worker behavior is influenced by many 
factors, so a worker decision game based on congestion game 
is designed to assist workers in decision-making.  
Firstly, the worker usually attaches importance to its benefit, 
which can be calculated by reward minus cost. The cost for a 
worker to accomplish a task mainly comes from the movement 
cost and sensing cost, hence the cost for worker Wj to 
accomplish task Ti is calculated as 
 Ci, j = γ ⋅ (MTi, j + STi, j ), (5) 
where γ is the price coefficient, which plays a similar role to α. 
Therefore, by calculating the reward Pi, j minus the cost Ci, j, 
the benefit for worker Wj to accomplish task Ti is calculated as 
 Fi, j = Pi, j − Ci, j. (6) 
Secondly, workers not only care about their benefit, but also 
have preferences for different tasks. The preference of worker 
Wj for task Ti is denoted as δi, j, with a value between 0 and 1. 
Specifically, 1 indicates that the worker likes the task most, and 
0 indicates that the worker least likes the task. 
Thirdly, workers’ competition for task resources will also 
affect workers’ decisions. The fiercer the competition among 
workers for a task, the more difficult it is for workers to match 
the task successfully. To measure the competition of workers 
for a task, a competition congestion metric is proposed. And the 
competition congestion metric of task Ti under the strategy 
profile S is calculated as 
 Ii(S) = 
sig( ∑ ci, j
j = k





where ci,j represents the status of whether worker Wj applies for 
task Ti and ti represents the number of samples required for task 
Ti. 
 sig(x) = {
x, x  0
0, x ≤ 0
. (8) 
Based on the above three indicators of worker benefit, 
worker preference and competition congestion metric, a set of 
non-negative and non-increasing functions is used to represent 
the worker utility. The worker utility is proportional to worker 
benefit and worker preference, and is inversely proportional to 
competition congestion metric, which is calculated as 
 Ui, j = (
Fi, j − min((Fi, j)i∈(1, n))
max((Fi, j)i∈(1, n)) − min((Fi, j)i∈(1, n))





where min((Fi, j)i∈(1, n))  and max((Fi, j)i∈(1, n))  represent the 
minimum and maximum benefit for worker Wj to accomplish 
tasks in task set TN, respectively. 
Although the worker utility is a good measure of the value a 
task brings to the worker, different workers may have different 
expectations of utility which are entirely determined by 
themselves. Therefore, we simplify the model by defining 
worker goal and worker score. In detail, worker Wj’s goal for 
the utility of completing task Ti is expressed as Ei, j, and worker 
Wj’s score for completing task Ti is expressed as Gi, j. In the 
worker decision game model, the state of worker score can be 
divided into the following categories: 
• A worker who applies for task Ti and the utility Ui, j is 
not smaller than the worker’s goal Ei, j is satisfied. In 
this case, the worker will not change its strategy profile, 
and the score Gi, j = 1. 
• A worker who applies for task Ti and the utility Ui, j is 
smaller than the worker goal Ei, j is unsatisfied, and the 
score Gi, j = −1. In this case, the worker will change its 
strategy profile to not apply for task Ti. 
• A worker who does not apply for task Ti is neutral, and 
the score Gi, j = 0. 
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Based on the above analysis, the worker Wj’s score for 
completing task Ti under the strategy profile S can be formally 
represented as: 
 Gi, j(S) = {
    1, if Ti ∈ sj and Ui, j ≥ Ei, j,
   0, if Ti ∉ sj,                          
−1, if Ti ∈ sj and Ui, j  Ei, j.
 (10) 
Hence, the worker Wj’s score under the strategy profile S is 
expressed as: 
 Gj(S) = ∑ Gi, j(S)
i = n
i = 1 . (11) 
To sum up, the mathematical formulation of worker benefit, 
worker preference, competition congestion, worker utility and 
worker score are given in the worker decision game. The goal 
of the game is to make workers as satisfied as possible by 
maximizing their scores. The problem is formalized as follows: 
 
max Φ(S) = ∑ Gj(S)
j = k
j = 1
s.t.  sj ⊆ TN,   ∀j ∈ (1, k).
 (12) 
On this basis, for each worker Wj  WK, the worker’s utility 
list Lj containing all tasks is generated, in which tasks are sorted 
from high to low according to the worker’s utility Ui, j for each 
task. 
B. Stable Matching 
On the basis of generated lists, the platform can achieve a 
stable matching between tasks and workers under the 
constraints of the number of samples required for tasks and the 
maximum workload of workers. 
In order to measure the degree of worker’s satisfaction with 
the matching result, the worker satisfaction with a value 
between 0 and 1 is proposed. To calculate it, a sequence of 
natural numbers starting at 1 is used to evaluate the rating of 
each task from high to low according to the utility to the worker. 
For example, suppose there is a worker W1 and three tasks T1, 
T2, and T3, whose utility to worker W1 is 0.5, 0.8, and 0.2, 
respectively. By sorting the utility values, the ratings of these 
tasks are marked as 2, 1, and 3. Obviously, the best result for 
worker W1 is matched to T2, while the worst result is matched 
to T3. The worker satisfaction is calculated as 











 represents the rating the worker gets when selecting 
the best result, Sworst
 j
 represents the rating the worker gets when 
selecting the worst result, and Smatch
 j
 represents the rating the 
worker gets in a final matching. 
Therefore, the original problem is divided into two sub-
problems namely as P1 and P2. In the first formulated 
subproblem P1, the aim of the worker is to match the task at the 
top of its utility list to maximize its satisfaction, which is 
formalized as follows: 
 
(P1) max ∑ Vj
j = k
j = 1
s.t.  ∑ xi, j ≤ ti
j = k
j = 1 ,  ∀Ti ∈ TN,        
 ∑ xi, j ≤ wj
i = n
i = 1 ,  ∀Wj ∈ WK,
                    xi, j = {0, 1},  ∀Ti ∈ TN,  ∀Wj ∈ WK. 
 (14) 
In the second formulated subproblem P2, the aim of the 
platform is to maximize task benefit, and the problem can be 
formalized as follows: 
 
(P2) max ∑ ∑ xi, j
j = k
j = 1 Bi, j
i = n
i = 1
s.t.  ∑ xi, j ≤ ti
j = k
j = 1 ,  ∀Ti ∈ TN,        
 ∑ xi, j ≤ wj
i = n
i = 1 ,  ∀Wj ∈ WK,
                    xi, j = {0, 1},  ∀Ti ∈ TN,  ∀Wj ∈ WK. 
 (15) 
By solving these two sub-problems, we can obtain worker-
task pairs with maximum worker satisfaction and maximum 
task benefit. In addition, different task execution order leads to 
different movement costs in practical applications. The total 
reward to each worker should be relevant to their task execution 
routes, which is calculated as 
 Pj(Rj) = β ⋅ Qj ⋅ (MTj + ST j), (16) 
where Rj is the task execution route of worker Wj. MTj and STj 
are the total movement time and total sensing time the worker 
Wj takes to execute tasks according to route Rj, respectively. 
The benefit that worker Wj brings to the platform is 
calculated as 
 Bj = Hj − Pj(Rj) = ∑ xi, jHi, j
i = n
i = 1 − β ⋅ Qj ⋅ (MTj + ST j). (17) 
The platform benefit is the sum of the benefit each worker 
brings to it, which is calculated as 
  Platform Benefit = ∑ Bj
j = k
j = 1 . (18) 
In order to maximize the platform benefit, the movement cost 
each worker spends on task execution should be minimized. 
Therefore, how to compute the shortest route between the 
worker and the tasks it matches becomes important. 
IV. COMPETITION-CONGESTION-AWARE STABLE MATCHING 
In this section, a competition-congestion-aware stable 
matching algorithm (CCASM) is designed to implement the 
aforementioned system models. The designed algorithm 
includes a list generation algorithm and a stable matching 
algorithm. 
A. The List Generation Algorithm 
The concept of the congestion game was first proposed by 
Rosenthal [30], which is usually used to solve the problem of 
multiple players competing for resources. Different players can 
complete for different resources, but the number of 
simultaneous players choosing the same resource affect each 
player’s revenue. In general, the more players choose the same 
resource, the less revenue each player gets. 
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7 
In order to better show the process of the list generation 
algorithm, we introduce the preliminary concepts of game as 
follows: 
Definition 1. (Better Response Action) The set of strategy 
profiles for all workers can be written as S = (sj, S−j), with S−j = 
(s1, s2, s3, …, sj−1, sj+ …, sk) represents the set of strategy 
profiles for all workers except worker Wj. The event where a 
worker changes its strategy profile from sj to sj’ is a better 
response action if and only if Gj(sj’, S−j)  Gj(sj, S−j). 
Definition 2. (Better Response Set) The set of tasks that 
enable the worker to make better response action is called the 
better response set, which is defined as 
 BRSj(S) = {Ti Ti ∈ sj’ and Gj(sj’ , S−j)  Gj(S)}. (19) 
Definition 3. (Pure Nash Equilibrium) When any worker 
under strategy profile S is unable to make a better response 
action, S is called pure Nash equilibrium strategy. 
Since the function Φ(S) defined as Eq. (12) is a non-negative 
and non-increasing potential function, the list generation 
algorithm can achieve Nash equilibrium in finite steps [31]. In 
this case, all workers are satisfied with their strategy profiles 
and will not change them. The specific process of algorithm is 
shown in Algorithm 1.  
B. The Stable Matching Algorithm 
David Gale and Lloyd Shapley first formally came up with 
the stable marriage problem [32], and proposed the deferred 
acceptance algorithm to find a stable matching for each man 
and each woman through the rules of proposal and rejection. 
Due to the deferred acceptance algorithm is designed to solve 
one-to-one matching problem, it is not suitable to many-to-
many task allocation problem in MCS. In this section, the 
deferred acceptance algorithm is extended to many-to-many by 
considering the maximum workload of workers and number of 
samples required for tasks. And the rules and concepts of stable 
matching are redefined.  
In this work, a matching pair is denoted as (Wj, Ti), which 
means worker Wj matches task Ti. For task Ti, the number of 
samples it requires is denoted as ti, and the number of pairs that 
have been matched is denoted as Ti•pair,  so the remaining 
number of pairs that can be matched is denoted as Ti•re = 
ti − Ti•pair. Similarly, for worker Wj, its maximum workload is 
denoted as wj, and the number of pairs that have been matched 
Algorithm 1 List Generation Algorithm Based on 
Congestion Game  
Input: the set of tasks TN, the set of workers WK, and the 
initial strategy profile S = 0. 
Output: The strategy profile S, the workers’ utility lists, and 
the tasks’ benefit lists. 
1: while for any worker Wj and the strategy profile S, 
BRSj(S)   do 
2:    The platform publicizes the task congestion (Ii(S))i  (1, 
n) to all the workers. 
3:    for Wj ∈ WK do 
4:       if BRSj(S)   then 
5:           The worker updates his/her strategy profile sj to 
all tasks in BRSj(S) and reports the updated 
strategy profile to the platform. 
6:           The platform updates the strategy profile S and 
the task congestion (Ii(S))i  (1, n). 
7:       end if 
8:    end for 
9: end while 
10: Construct the strategy profile S. 
11: for Wj  WK do 
12:  Sort the tasks in the worker’s strategy profile in 
descending order of utility. 
13: end for 
15: for Ti  TN do 
16:     Calculate the benefit that is achieved by allocating the 
task to each worker as Eq. (4). 
17:     Sort the workers in descending order of benefit. 
18: end for 
19: Generate workers’ utility lists and tasks’ benefit lists. 
 
Algorithm 2 Stable Matching Algorithm Based on 
Extended Deferred Acceptance 
Input: the set of tasks TN,  the set of workers WK,  the 
number ti  of samples required for task Ti, the 
maximum workload wj  of worker Wj, the set of 
workers that have not been fully matched Ω,  the 
task’s benefit list Li, and the worker’s utility list Lj. 
Output: The constructed routes for all workers. 
1: while Ω   do 
2:    for Wj ∈ WK do 
3:       Wj sends matching invitations to tasks in L
j in 
order. /* Invitation Rule */ 
4:       Calculate Ti•re = ti − Ti•pair. 
5:       if Ti•re  0 then 
6:          Form a candidate pair (Wj, Ti) and put it into Ψ. 
/* Acceptance Rule */ 
7:       else 
8:           Compare the rankings of inviters and workers that 
have been matched to Ti in its benefit list L
i. 
9:           Match the top ti ranked workers with Ti to form  
candidate pairs, put them into Ψ;  meanwhile, 
delete other pairs of Ti from Ψ. /* Rejection Rule 
*/ 
10:       end if 
11:       Calculate Wj•re = wj − Wj•pair. 
12:       Put the Wj which Wj•re ≠ 0 and have not been  
rejected by all the tasks he applied for into Ω, 
otherwise delete the Wj from Ω. 
13:    end for 
14: end while 
15: Construct the candidate pairs set Ψ. 
16: for Wj ∈ WK do 
17:      Construct a shortest task execution route by greedy-
edge method. 
18: end for 
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is denoted as Wj•pair, so the remaining number of pairs that can 
be matched is denoted as Wj•re = wj − Wj•pair . The sets of 
workers that have not been fully matched are denoted as Ω, i.e., 
Ω = WK  at the beginning of the Algorithm 2. The set of 
candidate pairs is denoted as Ψ, i.e., Ψ = ∅ at the beginning of 
the Algorithm 2.  
Considering the number of samples required for tasks and the 
maximum workload of workers, three rules are designed for the 
stable worker-task matching algorithm which are different from 
the deferred acceptance algorithm and shown below: 
Definition 4. (Invitation Rule) Each worker Wj ∈ WK  first 
sends matching invitations to tasks in its utility list Lj in order 
until Wj•re = 0. 
Definition 5. (Acceptance Rule) For each task Ti ∈ TN, if 
Ti•re  0, the matching invitation is accepted to form a candidate 
pair (Wj, Ti). Accordingly, the values of Wj•re and Ti•re decrease 
by 1. 
Definition 6. (Rejection Rule) For each task Ti ∈ TN , if 
Ti•re = 0 and there is an underlying pair such as (Wj’, Ti) that 
makes F
i, j’  min(Fi, j) , the new candidate pair (Wj’, Ti)  is 
formed and the previous candidate pair (Wj, Ti)  is broken. 
Otherwise, the underlying pair (W
j’
, Ti) is rejected. 
According to the above three rules, tasks and workers can be 
matched stably. Then, the set Ψ that contains all candidate pairs 
is constructed, based on which, a greedy-edge method is used 
to construct a shortest task execution route for each worker. 
Specifically, a worker and its matched tasks are regarded as the 
nodes of an undirected graph, and the distance between nodes 
is regarded as the edge of the undirected graph. The method 
adds a shortest edge to the task execution route each time, until 
the constructed task execution route passes through all nodes 
once and only once, that is, a complete Hamilton loop is 
obtained. The demonstration of these steps is described in detail 
in Algorithm 2.  
C. The Instance 
An instance of competition-congestion-aware stable worker-
task matching is depicted in Fig. 2. During the task allocation 
process, since worker’s benefit and preference for a task are 
fixed, the worker’s score for a task is only related to competition 
congestion metric. Therefore, to clearly reflect the impact of 
competition congestion on workers’ decision-making, we use 
Ei, j
I  representing the goal of worker Wj for the competition 
congestion of task Ti. Accordingly, Eq. (10) can be rewritten as:  
 Gi, j(S) = {
   1, if Ti ∈ sj and I
i(S) ≤ Ei, j
I ,
0, if Ti ∉ sj,                            
−1, if Ti ∈ sj and I
i(S) > Ei, j
I .
 (20) 
For the instance given in Fig. 2, the platform publicizes task 
information to workers. Then, the worker W1 determines its 
strategy profile S1 = (T1, T2, T3) by comparing the competition 
congestion Ii(S) and the worker’s goal Ei, j
I  for each task, and 
returns the strategy profile to platform. After that, the platform 
updates the competition congestion to all workers. After some 
steps, since the competition congestion of task T2 does not meet 
worker W3’s goal, worker W3 returns its updated strategy profile 
S3 = (T1, T3).  After some steps, as workers’ applications for 
task T3 increases, the competition congestion of task T3 is higher 
than worker W1’s goal, so worker W1 updates its strategy profile 
S1 = (T1, T2).  Repeating the above process, workers finally 
form stable strategy profiles, on which the platform generates 
workers’ utility lists and tasks’ benefit lists for stable matching 
process. At the beginning, worker W1 sends an invitation to task 
T2, which is the first task in its utility list, and forms the 
candidate pair (W1, T2) and now W1•re = 0. Then, worker W2 
sends an invitation to task T3, and forms the candidate pairs (W2, 
T3). Worker W2 sends an invitation to task T2, since now 
T2•re = 0 and worker W2 has a higher ranking than worker W1 in 
task T2’s benefit list, the candidate pair (W1, T2) is broken and a 
new candidate pair (W2, T2) is formed. Next, worker W3 sends 
an invitation to task T3. Since now T3•re = 0 and worker W3 has 
a lower ranking than worker W2 in task T3’s benefit list, worker 
W3’s invitation is rejected. Therefore, worker W3 sends a new 
invitation to task T1 and forms (W3, T1). Since the candidate pair 
(W1, T2) is broken, the worker W1 has not been matched fully 
and now W1•re = 1. Therefore, worker W1 sends an invitation to 
task T1 to form the candidate pair (W1, T1). At this point, all 
three workers are matched completely and fully. The final 
matching result is Ψ = {(W1, T1), (W2, T2), (W2, T3), (W3, T1)}. 
T1                2              0             0
T2                1              0             0
T3                1              0             0
            
                    0.7             
   W1           0.8          ( T1, T2, T3 )
                    0.7
Task ti  ci,  j I
i
(S) Worker Strategy Profile
...
T1                2              4            0.5
 T2                1              3           0.67
 T3                1              3           0.67
Task ti  ci,  j I
i
(S)
T1                2              5          0.6
 T2                1              3         0.67
T3                1              5          0.8
Task ti  ci,  j I
i
(S)
 Publicize task information
Return the strategy profile
...
     Workers  Utility Lists                          Tasks  Benefit Lists
     W1           ( T2, T1 )                                  T1          ( W2, W3, W1 )
     W2           ( T3, T2, T1 )                           T2          ( W2, W1, W3 ) 
     W3           ( T3, T1 )                                  T3          ( W1, W2, W3 )  
 Sort the tasks in the worker s strategy 
profile in descending order of utility
wj Utility List L
j
W1               1           T2, T1
    W2                2        T3, T2, T1
W3                1          T3, T1
Tasks ti Benefit List L
i
T1           2       W2, W3, W1 
T2           1       W2, W1, W3
T3           1       W1, W2, W3
Matching result          Ψ = {(W1, T1), (W2, T2), (W2, T3), (W3, T1)}
Send an invitation
Reject an invitation
Form a candidate pair
Break a candidate pair
Update task information
            
                    0.6             
    W3          0.3               ( T1, T3 )
                    0.8
Return the strategy profile 
Stage 1  List Generation
Stage 2   Stable Matching
Worker Strategy Profile
            
                    0.7             
    W1          0.8               ( T1, T2 )







 IUpdate task information 
Return the strategy profile 
Sort the workers in 
descending order of benefit
Workers
Task execution route          W1: T1          W2: T2   T3          W3: T1
Greedy-edge method
Fig. 2.  An instance of competition-congestion-aware stable worker-task 
matching. 
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Finally, through the greedy-edge method, the shortest task 
execution route of each worker can be obtained.  
D. Stability, Optimality, and Complexity Analysis 
The stability, optimality, and complexity of the designed 
CCASM algorithm are analyzed as follows: 
1) Stability Analysis 
Before stability analysis, we introduce the concept of 
blocking pair. 
Definition 7. (Blocking Pair) A pair (Wj, Ti) is a blocking pair 
which can block a match if Wj prefers Ti to at least one of the 
tasks it has matched and Ti prefers Wj to at least one of the 
workers it has matched. 
When Algorithm 1 finishes, all workers are satisfied and 
unable to make a better response action under strategy profile S, 
so the game result is stable.  
Then, due to the number of workers and tasks is not 
necessarily equal, the stable matching for many-to-many 
matching problem should be ensured to be both complete and 
stable. Hence, the concept of stable matching is redefined in 
definition 8.  
Definition 8. (Stable Matching) (i) The match is complete, 
which means that all workers or all tasks have matched fully 
and completely. (ii) The match is stable, which means that for 
each candidate pair, there is no blocking pair that can be used 
as a better underlying choice to break it. 
When Algorithm 2 finishes, the matching result is stable. 
Proof: Since each worker sends invitations to tasks in its 
utility list in order, as the algorithm runs, there is always a 
moment that all workers or all tasks are matched fully and 
completely. Next, in order to prove that there is no blocking pair 
for the matching result, we adopt the reduction to absurdity. We 
assume that there is at least one blocking pair (Wp, Tq) after 
matching. We define a function f
j
(x) which maps the ranking of 
each task in the worker Wj’s utility list to a real integer. For 
example, suppose the utility list of worker W1 is {T2, T3, T1}, 
then f
1
(T2) = 1 , f1(T3) = 2 , and f1(T1) = 3 . Similarly, we 
define a function g
i
(x) which maps the ranking of each worker 
in the task Ti’s benefit list to a real integer. The set of tasks that 
worker Wj has matched is represented as 𝒲𝑗 , the set of workers 
that task Ti has matched is represented as 𝒯𝑖 . According to 
definition 7, it can be deduced that: 
Inference 1. ∃ Tm  ∈  𝒲p, fp(Tm) > fp(Tq) (i.e., in the set 𝒲p, 
there is at least one task Tm which is ranked lower than task Tq 
in worker Wp’s utility list). 
Inference 2. ∃ Wn  ∈  𝒯q, gq(Wn) > gq(Wp) (i.e., in the set 𝒯q, 
there is at least one worker Wn which is ranked lower than 
worker Wp in task Tq’s benefit list). 
The inference 1 shows that task Tm is ranked lower than task 
Tq. Since worker Wp sends invitations to tasks in its utility list 
in order, it can be inferred that the worker Wp has invited the 
task Tq. However, Wp is not matched with Tq in the end, which 
means the invitation was rejected or the candidate pair was 
broken by other workers in 𝒯q. So, it can be deduced that: 
Inference 3. ∀ Wj  ∈  𝒯q, gq(Wj) < gq(Wp) (i.e., in the set 𝒯q, 
all workers are ranked higher than worker Wp in task Tq’s 
benefit list). 
 Obviously, inference 3 is contrary to inference 2. Therefore, 
the assumption is invalid, that is, there is no blocking pair for 
the matching result. Based on the above analysis, the matching 
result is stable. 
2) Optimality Analysis 
For the algorithm 1, since each worker can add all satisfied 
tasks to its strategy profile, the game result is optimal. 
For the algorithm 2, when the matching is finished, both 
workers and tasks cannot find a better solution to enhance 
worker satisfaction or task benefit besides the matching result. 
Therefore, each worker and task under the matching result are 
at least as well as it would be under other stable matching results, 
so the matching result is not only stable but also Pareto optimal.  
3) Complexity Analysis 
For list generation, the computation complexity of 
congestion game is O(k2), the computation complexity of 
sorting n tasks and k workers in descending order are Ο(nlogn) 
and Ο(klogk) respectively. For stable matching, the 
computation complexity of the iterative matching process is 
Ο(nk), the computation complexity of constructing the shortest 
task execution routes of k workers is Ο(nklogn). Therefore, the 
maximum computation complexity of the designed algorithm is 
max{O(k2), Ο(nklogn)}. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Experimental Setting 
1) Data Sets and Model Settings 
The following three data sets are employed in the simulation 
to validate the designed model and algorithm. 
• Berlin52 [33]. The data set contains the coordinate 
information of 52 locations in Berlin. The locations of 
tasks and workers are randomly generated from these 
coordinates. 
• NRW1379 [33]. Similarly, the data set contains the 
coordinate information of 1,379 locations in Nordrhein-
Westfalen. The locations of tasks and workers are 
randomly generated from these coordinates. 
• GeoLife [34]. The data set was gathered in the Geolife 
project (Microsoft Research Asia) by 182 participants in 
a period of over three years (from April 2007 to August 
2012). The GPS trajectories of this dataset are 
represented by time-stamped points, each of which 
contains the latitude and longitude. This data set 
contains 17,621 trajectories with a total distance of 
about 1.2 million kilometers and a total duration of 
48,203+ hours. In the simulation, we select workers in 
the area which is in the northern latitude from 39.975 to 
40.025, and eastern longitude from 116.31 to 116.35. In 
addition, the locations of tasks are randomly generated 
in the area. 
For each data set, the simulation parameters are summarized 
in Table II. 
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2) Benchmark Algorithms 
In order to emphasize the advantages of worker decision 
game, we compare CCASM with the algorithm without 
considering competition congestion: 
• Traditional Stable Matching (TSM): This algorithm 
does not consider the impact of competition congestion 
on workers’ decision-making in the MCS system. In the 
algorithm, the worker’s utility list is generated based on 
worker benefit and worker preference, and then the 
algorithm 2 is adopted for many-to-many stable worker-
task matching. On this basis, tasks are allocated to 
workers according to the results of stable matching. 
Moreover, in order to emphasize the advantages of the 
designed model and algorithm, we utilize the following baseline 
task allocation algorithms for comparative studies:  
• Random Allocation (RA): This algorithm randomly 
allocates tasks to workers based on the number of 
samples required for tasks and the maximum workload 
of workers constraints.  
• Asynchronous Task Selection (ATS): This algorithm 
simulates the process of workers’ asynchronous and 
distributed task selection, which is a common way [35] 
for workers to participate in MCS activities through 
mobile phones. Workers apply for tasks they are 
satisfied with in the order they arrive at the mobile app, 
and the platform allocates tasks to them based on their 
requests. In order to avoid the influence of workers’ 
arrival order, we conducted multiple experiments to get 
the average value. 
• Greedy for Worker Satisfaction (GWS): This algorithm 
adopts greedy algorithm to maximize worker 
satisfaction in MCS system, and the optimization target 
is shown in Eq. (14). The algorithm selects worker-task 
pairs from high to low according to the utilities in Eq. 
(9). 
• Greedy-enhanced Genetic Algorithm (GGA): This 
algorithm [20] combines greedy algorithm and genetic 
algorithm, and uses the result of GWS as the input of 
population initiation to obtain a better solution. In detail, 
the three parameters of generation number, population 
size and mutation rate are 100, 200 and 0.05 respectively. 
• Greedy for Platform Benefit (GPB): This algorithm 
adopts greedy algorithm to maximize platform benefit 
in MCS system, and the optimization target is shown in 
Eq. (15). It selects worker-task pairs from high to low 
according to the benefit in Eq. (4), thus enabling the 
platform to obtain as much benefit as possible. 
TABLE II 
SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Symbol Description Value 
Q
j
 The sensing quality of worker Wj. 0 ~ 1 
STi, j The sensing time that worker Wj takes to 
execute task Ti. 
10 ~ 20 min 
α Price coefficient. 12 
β Price coefficient. 3 
γ Price coefficient. 1 
v Average movement speed of workers. 60 m/min 
δi, j Worker Wj’s preference for task Ti. 0 ~ 1 
ti Number of samples required for task Ti. 1 ~ 4 
wj Maximum workload of worker Wj. 1 ~ 4 
Ei, j Worker Wj’s goal for the utility of 
completing task Ti. 
0 ~ 1 
 
     
(a)                                                                            (b)                                                                           (c) 
Fig. 3.  Comparison of the influence of CCASM and TSM in (a) Berlin52, (b) NRW1379, and (c) GeoLife on average worker satisfaction when the number of 
tasks changes. 
 
     
(a)                                                                            (b)                                                                           (c) 
Fig. 4.  Comparison of the influence of CCASM and TSM in (a) Berlin52, (b) NRW1379, and (c) GeoLife on average worker satisfaction when the number of 
workers changes. 
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By the way, the greedy-edge method is adopted to construct 
shortest task execution routes for workers after getting the task 
allocation results from the above five algorithms. 
3) Evaluation Metrics 
• Average Worker Satisfaction 
Average worker satisfaction is characterized by the average 
satisfaction of all workers who have received tasks, which is 
used to evaluate the worker’s satisfaction with task allocation. 
• Platform Benefit 
The platform benefit is the sum of the benefit each worker 
brings to it, which is calculated as Eq. (18). 
B. Performance Evaluation and Discussion 
To illustrate the effectiveness and superiority of the designed 
model and algorithm, we will show their results in task 
allocation and compare them with aforementioned benchmark 
algorithms.  
1) Superiority of Model with Congestion 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show CCASM’s superiority over TSM in 
terms of average worker satisfaction when the number of tasks 
and workers changes respectively. In detail, as shown in Fig. 3, 
(i) when the number of tasks is small, CCASM is significantly 
better than TSM. (ii) When the number of tasks increases, the 
average worker satisfaction in CCASM and TSM increases. (iii) 
When the number of tasks is large, the performance of CCASM 
and TSM are similar. The reasons are that (i) when the number 
of workers is fixed and the number of tasks is small, the 
competition congestion is high, so many workers may not be 
able to match the tasks they are satisfied with. However, 
CCASM can make the overall decision of workers more stable 
and assist them in making favorable decisions. (ii) The increase 
in the number of tasks means less competition congestion. In 
this case, workers are more likely to match the tasks they are 
satisfied with, so the average worker satisfaction increases. (iii) 
When the number of tasks is significantly larger than the 
number of workers, there is almost no competition congestion, 
so the performance of CCASM and TSM is similar. The results 
in Fig. 4 can also be interpreted in the same way. It is worth 
mentioning that CCASM still performs well when the number 
of tasks is fixed and the number of workers increases. This is 
because when the competition for a task is too fierce, some 
workers may abandon the application for the task and apply for 
other tasks they are satisfied with. In summary, the worker 
decision game can significantly improve workers' satisfaction.    
2) Average Worker Satisfaction 
Fig. 5 shows CCASM versus five baselines in terms of 
average worker satisfaction when the number of tasks changes. 
Obviously, CCASM performs best in terms of average worker 
satisfaction and GPB performs the worst. This is because 
CCASM tries to match workers with tasks they are satisfied 
with, while GPB is an optimization algorithm aimed at 
maximizing platform benefit which ignores worker satisfaction 
in task allocation. Moreover, as the number of tasks increases, 
the CCASM, GGA, GWS, and ATS perform better. The reason 
is that when the number of workers is fixed, as the number of 
tasks increases, workers are more likely to receive satisfactory 
tasks. Fig. 6 shows the performance of CCASM is better than 
ATS, RA, and GPB when the number of workers changes. In 
addition, CCASM performs similarly to GGA and GWS in Fig. 
6(a), and worse than GGA and GWS in Fig. 6(b) and Fig. 6(c). 
This is because as the number of workers increases, the 
competition among workers becomes more fierce, resulting in 
a decrease of average worker satisfaction. 
     
(a)                                                                            (b)                                                                           (c) 
Fig. 5.  Comparison of the influence of CCASM and baselines in (a) Berlin52, (b) NRW1379, and (c) GeoLife on average worker satisfaction when the number of 
tasks changes. 
 
     
(a)                                                                            (b)                                                                           (c) 
Fig. 6.  Comparison of the influence of CCASM and baselines in (a) Berlin52, (b) NRW1379, and (c) GeoLife on average worker satisfaction when the number of 
workers changes. 
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3) Platform Benefit 
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the difference between CCASM and 
above-mentioned baselines in terms of platform benefit when 
the number of tasks and workers changes respectively. 
Obviously, since the optimization goal of GPB is to maximize 
platform benefit, it has the best performance. In addition, when 
the number of workers is small and the number of tasks is large, 
CCASM performs similar to ATS, GWS, and GGA. Conversely, 
when the number of workers is large and the number of tasks is 
small, CCASM performs significantly better than RA, ATS, 
GWS, and GGA. In this case, the competition among workers 
is relatively fierce, and CCASM matches tasks with workers 
who can bring the most benefit to the task, thereby improving 
platform benefit.  
In summary, when the competition for tasks is relatively mild, 
CCASM performs better than baselines in terms of average 
worker satisfaction. While in the case of fierce competition for 
tasks, CCASM not only performs well in average worker 
satisfaction, but also improves platform benefit significantly. 
According to the above discussions, it can be concluded that the 
designed model and algorithm are effective and meaningful.   
VI. DISCUSSION 
In this section, we discuss issues that are not reported or 
addressed in this work due to space constraints, which are the 
directions of our future work. We are mainly concerned with 
task benefit, worker benefit, worker preference, and 
competition congestion metric when formulating our stable 
matching problem. Other types of factors may need to be 
considered in stable matching, such as worker reputation, task 
urgency, etc. Besides, this paper only considers two constraints 
when solving the stable matching problem, one is the number 
of samples required for the task, and the other is the maximum 
workload of workers. We plan to explore more fine-grained 
constraints in the future work, such as the maximum working 
hours of workers. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The existing stable matching studies lack deep 
consideration regarding the effects of workers’ competition 
phenomena and complex behaviors, which may reduce 
workers’ satisfaction and enthusiasm for participation in 
sensing activities. In this paper, we investigated a competition-
congestion-aware stable matching problem by considering the 
competition of workers for tasks. Due to the competition and 
complex behaviors of workers, a worker decision game based 
on congestion game theory is designed to improve worker 
satisfaction by jointly considering worker benefit, worker 
preference, and competition congestion metric. On this basis, a 
stable matching algorithm based on extended deferred 
acceptance algorithm is designed to make workers and tasks 
mapping stable, and to construct the shortest task execution 
route for each worker. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed 
mechanism is verified by comparing it with traditional 
benchmark stable matching algorithm and five baseline task 
allocation algorithms. Simulation results show that the designed 
algorithm performs well in worker satisfaction and platform 
benefit.  
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